The Relentless Growth of Degrowth Economics Europe’s push to abandon capitalism is motivated by optimism about politics—and pessimism about everything else.
The Relentless Growth of Degrowth Economics
Europe’s push to abandon capitalism is motivated by optimism about politics—and pessimism about everything else.
DECEMBER 17, 2023, 7:00 AM
By Jessi Jezewska Stevens, a writer of fiction and criticism.
An illustration shows an inverted black and white image of the city skyline of Frankfurt split down the middle with a paper tear revealing a green background. Against the field of green, a cross section of a tree and a seedling are shown.
FOREIGN POLICY ILLUSTRATION/GETTY IMAGES
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The ninth International Degrowth Conference, held in August this year in Zagreb, Croatia, opens with a provocation. Keynote speaker Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, the newly elected vice chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has two requests to make of the audience. The first is to figure out how to coordinate with governments of all stripes, since the climate crisis requires global unity.
The second? “Maybe consider a different word.”
It’s about as close to blasphemy as this niche, academic, and politically radical conference can get.
To a rising minority of European leftists, the term “degrowth” is proving an attraction rather than a turnoff. The protean climate movement that exists under its banner is gaining momentum among academics, youth activists, and, increasingly, policymakers across the continent.
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The European Parliament hosted its second (and terminologically defanged) Beyond Growth Conference just this past May, this time with unprecedented buy-in from elected officials; as organizer and European Parliament member Philippe Lamberts (of the Belgian Greens) told the Financial Times, the “big shots” are now “playing ball.”
Those in Zagreb frame the Brussels push as “extraordinary” and “major,” with the parliament building “filled to the brim” by a new swell of activists, nongovernmental organizations, academics, and elected officials totaling some 7,000 strong. Julia Steinberger, a longtime researcher of the social and economic impacts of climate change at the University of Lausanne, adds: “And they were young.”
This energy carries over to the degrowth circuit proper, which multiple veterans tell me has long outgrown its humble beginnings. At a watershed, self-organized gathering in Leipzig, Germany in 2014, ragtag participants made their own meals. This year’s conference, by contrast, is co-sponsored by the city of Zagreb, attended by the mayor and representatives of the IPCC, and professionally catered with vegan canapés.
With its deepest roots in direct democracy and anti-capitalism, the degrowth movement is bent on challenging the central tenet of postwar economics: that further increases in GDP—strongly correlated with increases in carbon emissions—translate to further advances in social and individual well-being.
The implications of the critique extend far beyond the usual calls for countries to reach net-zero emissions targets. To degrowthers, the climate crisis is a social problem, and addressing it will require no less than reengineering the entire global, socioeconomic order, especially in the wealthy global north.
Why the sudden interest in this radical program? Why Europe, and why now?
Perhaps the answer should be obvious: Late August 2023, when the Zagreb event convenes, caps off the hottest global summer ever recorded. The defining characteristic of degrowth’s latest influx of followers, as the movement’s major figures will stress to me again and again over the next four days, is youth—which is to say, a heightened vulnerability to the future effects of climate change.
The status quo has left these young supporters disillusioned and alarmed. And no wonder. When, during her keynote address, Ürge-Vorsatz draws up a heat map showing the proportion of the Earth that will become unsuitable for human life by 2070 under business-as-usual projections, no one bats an eye; it’s data that this particular audience has seen before.
The suggestion to “find a better word,” however, is met with an affronted laugh. For Europe’s young people, degrowth isn’t just a utopian slogan, but an intentionally provocative, environmental necessity—and an existing reality.
Yellow paint coats the large front windows of a Ferrari car dealership in London, dripping down and partially obscuring everything inside. A red Ferrari sports car is seen in the showroom behind the glass wall dripping with paint.
Yellow dye coats the front windows of a Ferrari car dealership in London after a climate protest against capitalism and oil consumption on Oct. 26, 2022.RICHARD BAKER/IN PICTURES VIA GETTY IMAGES
Parallel to these radical calls to abandon economic growth as a policy goal, many economists have observed that capitalism in developed countries is already slowing down, seemingly of its own accord, and very much against the mainstream political will. The trend is called (in a manner that hardly satisfies Ürge-Vorsatz’s invitation to find a more appealing term) “secular stagnation,” and it predicts that in highly developed economies, a near future of stagnant growth is more or less inevitable.
This slowdown in the year-over-year growth of GDP per capita is detectible in wealthy industrialized countries such as Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, according to economists such as Dietrich Vollrath, whose book Fully Grown describes this phenomenon.
The economic deceleration is accompanied by a rise in inequality, which contributes to increased polarization on both the left and the right.
The deceleration is accompanied by a rise in inequality, which contributes to increased polarization on both the left and the right. Poorly managed energy transitions and climate-induced disasters are poised to exacerbate the trend. So are declining fertility rates, which lead to a lopsided age distribution in the workforce, putting further strain on welfare systems. While it is tempting to ascribe the decline in birth rates primarily to the rising cost of having children in rich countries, in the EU, generous benefits to parents (Hungary, for example, recently waived personal income tax for mothers under 30, among other pro-family measures) have failed to turn the tide. At a certain point, wealthy societies in advanced stages of modern capitalism no longer want to grow.
As a consequence, for the first time since the mid-20th-century, young people from the world’s richest nations, such as those gathered here in Zagreb, cannot expect to be better off than their parents.
The anxious backdrop is enough to make one wonder whether the uptick of interest in degrowth isn’t, in fact, just another symptom of a lack of economic growth in Europe, coupled with impending environmental degradation. It brings into focus a bigger historical picture, one of wealthy countries around the world struggling to manage ecological decline and rising domestic discontent when the usual remedy—rapid growth—may be as economically impossible as it is environmentally dubious.
If such degrowth is inevitable, degrowthers ask—if for a very different set of reasons—how can it best be managed?
And is it possible for Europe to greet it with anything other than anxiety and despair?
A lone deer peers out from behind the seared trunks of trees in a burnt forest following a wildfire. The woods and burnt undergrowth are dark brown and black, meaning that the pale brown doe is the brightest color in the photo.
A deer peers out from behind trees in a burnt forest following a wildfire in Gironde in southwestern France on Aug. 13, 2022. THIBAUD MORITZ/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
On the opening night of the International Degrowth Conference, at a reception held in the lobby of the Zagreb Museum of Contemporary Art, at least two surveys of the 680 registered participants are going around, gathering demographics in the name of ongoing academic research. The shoe-leather approach provides a good estimate: A quick turn though the crowd proves the attendees to be overwhelmingly white, youthful, and fit.
And yet, considerable diversity exists within that apparent uniformity. Degrowth is a big tent, one that attracts graduate students, activists, Marxists, feminists, decolonizationists, and in more recent years, elected politicians, all of them disillusioned with the promises of “green growth” inscribed in the EU Green Deal, or in the United States’ growth-oriented Inflation Reduction Act. It could be described as an academic field, an intellectual crossroads, a political movement—or better yet, given its versatile nature, as a cultural one.
The term decroissance first emerged in France during the resource debates of the 1970s, when the Club of Rome published its famous 1972 report, The Limits to Growth, which is still one of the most controversial and bestselling environmental books of all time. That study argued that exploding global population and resource use would exceed the Earth’s carrying capacity within one generation, resulting in a precipitous decline in welfare.
Strongly influenced by a natural scientist’s understanding of the conservation of energy (as opposed to an economist’s understanding of abstract and theoretically limitless variables, such as demand), the report popularized the enduring idea that there is no infinite growth on a finite planet. Kenneth Boulding, author of the essay “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth,” echoed the concept in congressional testimony delivered during a discussion of the global ecological situation in 1973: “Anyone who believes that exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist.”
Ecologists warn that we have now exceeded four of nine planetary boundaries that define a habitable planet.
Predicting the future is a risky business. The Club of Rome report was—and still is—ridiculed by mainstream analysts, who pointed to the fact that the next generation became, au contraire, ever richer and more populous. Others rightly questioned the report’s tendency to stoke the West’s racist fears of population growth in the global south. From a purely ecological view, however, research from natural scientists continues to suggest that the 1972 study got more right than wrong; ecologists warn that we have now exceeded four of nine planetary boundaries that define a habitable planet.
Today’s iteration of degrowth, translated from the French, disavows these earlier debates’ Malthusian focus on population growth, instead shifting the emphasis to per capita consumption. This time, the culprit is decadence in the global north.
Embracing the ethos of anti-consumerism, anti-advertising, and decolonization, the idea of reorienting rich economies away from the hegemonic pursuit of GDP growth gained purchase in France and Southern Europe following the 2008-09 financial crisis—which was seen as yet another consequence of the reckless pursuit of growth—and the austerity measures that it drew into its wake.
Vincent Liegey, a French thinker, author, and organizer who was active in those earliest years of the degrowth movement, tells me that these days, degrowth might be best understood as a “tool,” one used “to question dominant paradigms and address 21st-century problems with [the idea of] well-being.”